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Abstract 
By channelling the results of recent scholarship into policymaking and feeding new policy 
developments into the academic discourse, this paper aims at contributing to a joint reflection on the 
development of EU international cultural relations in the context of global public diplomacy 
embedded in a wider process of eroding state sovereignties, the rise of non-governmental actors, and 
the acceleration of information technology. Investigating how the EU could be positioned among 
world powers in the intensifying race for soft power in the twenty-first century, the paper argues that 
Member States can only influence these global movements by acting together. It concludes that the 
new institutional dynamics of the Lisbon Treaty may take the nascent EU strategy further than its 
predecessors and, notwithstanding the immense challenges, can also be interpreted as a timely 
reminder to uphold the fundamental values of European integration even under difficult 
circumstances. Overall, this seems to indicate that strengthening the symbolic and cultural dimension 
could be an important factor in the EU’s foreign policy, and the new approach based on mutual 
outreach could facilitate mutual understanding as well as the fight against radicalization and populism 
Keywords 
EU; international; culture; diplomacy; soft power 
  1 
Introduction* 
This paper aims at providing a constructive analysis of the Joint Communication ‘Towards an EU 
Strategy for international cultural relations’ adopted by the European Commission (EC) and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy in June 2016 (European Commission, 
2016a) in the broader context of the EC’s and the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) efforts 
to revisit the EU’s Public Diplomacy in order to facilitate a more effective EU engagement in third 
countries. I point out that both within and outside Europe these efforts are embedded in the much 
broader phenomena of eroding state sovereignty, the rise of non-governmental actors, and the rapid 
expansion of information technology. By channelling the results of recent scholarship into 
policymaking as well as feeding new policy developments into the academic discourse, this paper will 
attempt to contribute to a joint reflection on how the new approach to cultural diplomacy could, 
among others, build bridges between peoples and facilitate mutual understanding. It will also 
investigate the degree to which this may become an efficient tool to counter radicalization and 
populism as well as how it could enrich international development. 
I will explore the extent to which the nascent strategy can reinforce the EU’s actions on the global 
scene by strengthening international partnerships, building on its distinctive soft-power potential. 
Ideas and concrete examples are compiled to review in detail the new strategic framework’s 
implementation capacity with the new model for cooperation with Member States, national cultural 
institutes, private and public operators. How Europe could be positioned among the emerging new 
world powers at the beginning of the twenty-first century is also examined. By shedding light on the 
early phase of its implementation through the on-going work conducted in the framework of the 
Cultural Diplomacy Platform, the Council's Work Plan for Culture, and the responsible EC/EEAS 
services with a special focus on the elevated role of EU Delegations, I intend to show that 
strengthening the symbolic and cultural dimension could be an important factor in foreign policy as 
well as in facilitating a sense of belonging to Europe. 
I will argue that the Lisbon Treaty changed the institutional dynamics and that the unprecedented 
‘twin track approach’ of cultural and foreign policy agents working closely together may take the 
nascent strategy further than many previous EU initiatives in the cultural field. The Joint 
Communication can also be interpreted as a timely reminder to uphold the fundamental values of 
European integration even under very difficult circumstances such as an upsurge of authoritarian 
nationalism, Brexit, the economic and migration crises, some Member States’ reluctance to embrace 
the paradigm shift to engage in collaborative projects, and, especially in post-colonial states, a sense of 
resentment of ‘Western/European cultural superiority’.  
The paper begins with a critical review of the genealogy of EU international cultural relations, 
showing that the Joint Communication is the result of the cumulative efforts of cultural stakeholders 
and European institutions. This process has its roots in the early attempts to Europeanise the national 
public discourses and the quest for a European identity and had thus already begun around the time of 
the Maastricht Treaty. Nonetheless, my focus will be on recent developments, primarily through the 
lens of key documents by EU institutions.  
The next section will situate the EU’s efforts to pursue international cultural relations in the context 
of public diplomacy on a global scale, coupled with an analysis of the terminology and use of soft 
power. It will highlight the fact that in recent decades, riding the waves of a ‘global cultural 
revolution’, a growing number of emerging economies have been catching up with the ‘traditional 
masters of soft power’—the US and the EU—and while the ‘top league’ is still dominated by the 
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West, major BRICS (especially Chinese) actors are actively trying to change this to gain greater global 
influence. However, if EU Member States act together, they should be able to withstand these 
pressures.  
The third section will explore how the the EU responds to the new challenges by advocating a new 
model for cooperation with Member States, national cultural institutes, and private and public 
operators in order to create synergies during the Joint Communication’s implementation. First, I will 
focus on the Joint Communication’s innovative points to show that early engagement of key actors, in 
terms of both institutional follow-up and stakeholder activity, was ensured; this is expressed in the 
latest Council Conclusions agreeing to draw up an integrated strategic approach for international 
cultural relations. Second, I will examine the internal arrangements of the responsible EC and EEAS 
services to ensure coherence and a long-term perspective, including plans for a proper financing 
mechanism. Third, I will evaluate the significance of pilot projects in the new strategic approach, 
pointing out that instead of replacing what Member States have been doing well for many years on 
their own, these are actions where a joint approach yields more benefits than those delivered by the 
sum of bilateral initiatives.  
The final section will consider the perspectives and relevance of the nascent strategy in the rapidly-
evolving international and intra-EU context through a critical examination of the approach taken in the 
last few years, outlining both its advantages and weaknesses. It will reflect on how the main players 
across the globe use their soft power and the role of cultural diplomacy today, taking into account the 
rapidly evolving North-South power relationship and how it relates to EU development policy. 
Given this topic’s interdisciplinary nature and the relatively scarce academic literature, I rely on a 
social constructivist approach combined with my personal observations ‘on the ground’. Secondary 
qualitative data will be examined in the context of actual policymaking, also drawing extensively on 
my experience in the Commission and Council. Primary data collected through face-to-face interviews 
with senior EU and Member State officials managing this dossier will be complemented with a 
critical, close reading of selected EU policy documents and recent scholarship. Finally, I will also 
integrate the results of presentations and discussions of an EL-CSID workshop in April and a high-
level policy workshop at the EUI in May 2017 with the participation of key policy actors and 
renowned scholars in the field of EU international cultural relations.  
1. Genealogy of the nascent EU strategy for international cultural relations 
The Joint Communication is the result of a long-standing cumulative effort of cultural stakeholders 
and European institutions. The Maastricht Treaty contained the first legal provisions on culture, but 
the roots go back to early attempts to Europeanize the national public discourses and the search for a 
common narrative as first set out officially in the 1973 Declaration on European Identity and followed 
by the 1975 Tindemans Report. Even earlier, public diplomacy activities had an important role in 
reconciling public opinion in the founding countries of the European Communities in the aftermath of 
World War II. In this context, prominent efforts have been made to use culture to create a European 
identity, a special sense of belonging, most notably in the Adonnino report (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1985) submitted to the Milan European Council of June 1985, which decided 
on the culturally-based political symbols of the EU flag and anthem. The report also contained several 
ideas that found their way into the cultural policy discourse and re-emerged in subsequent years as 
concrete proposals relating to cultural heritage, such as town twinning. Y Raj Isar (2015) offers an 
insightful account of this process, referring also to the seminal research of Chris Shore (2000) and 
Monica Sassatelli (2009), among others. 
More recently, in 2005, in the wake of the negative referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in 
France and the Netherlands, there has been renewed discussion among policymakers, stakeholders, 
and civil-society organizations alike on how to move Europe forward. Throughout this process, 
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influential NGOs and advocacy platforms, especially the European Cultural Foundation and Culture 
Action Europe, have played a very important role through their constructive collaboration with EU 
institutions, particularly the European Parliament and the European Commission (Isar, 2015). As a 
result, the drive to include cultural policy as a core element of EU foreign policy received a major 
boost which, in May 2007, led to the adoption of the ‘European Agenda for Culture in a globalizing 
world’ (European Commission, 2007). This was endorsed the following November, with a Council 
Resolution of the Ministers of Culture (Council of the European Union, 2007) welcoming the 
perspective to develop further cooperation in the cultural field, increase the coherence and visibility of 
European action, and strengthen the transversal role of culture. The Council also agreed with the 
strategic and specific objectives proposed by the Commission at the time, among which enhancing the 
role of culture in the EU’s external relations and development policy already held a prominent place. 
In June 2008, in the context of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, the European Council also 
‘recognised the value of cultural cooperation and intercultural dialogue as an integral part of all 
relevant external policies’ in a rather cautiously worded paragraph in its Conclusions (Council of the 
European Union, 2008a).  
The contrast between the culture ministers’ decisive, detailed text and the rather thin language of 
Heads of States or Governments seems to reflect not only the fact that culture remains primarily a 
clear national (and/or regional) competence, but also a different degree of interest and ownership in 
this field at the highest political level in most (though not all) EU countries. Such an impression is 
reinforced by a comparison with the Council Conclusions by Ministers of Culture issued half a year 
later (Council of the European Union, 2008b), which effectively calls for ‘drawing up a European 
strategy for incorporating culture consistently and systematically in the external relations of the 
Union’ as well as for ‘establishing specific strategies with regions and countries outside the Union’ 
that should be tailored to their economic and social situations through a consultation process with the 
entities concerned. In addition, it also expresses support for a long list of actions, many of which have 
since been taken up in the triennial Work Plans for Culture. In fact, to date, these two Council 
Conclusions remain the strongest official commitment by Member States to work together in the 
cultural domain, which, even with the cautious backing of the European Council, created fertile terrain 
to move on institutionally and for concrete actions across the globe. 
Prompted by the establishment of the European External Action Service, the EC’s implementation 
report on the European Agenda for Culture in 2010 (European Commission, 2010), as well as 
intensive stakeholder activity, the next major institutional step was the European Parliament’s 
adoption in May 2011 of an ambitious Resolution on the cultural dimensions of the EU’s external 
action (European Parliament, 2011). Always one of the most ardent supporters of cultural initiatives 
(Duke, 2013), the European Parliament proposed streamlining external EU cultural policy and projects 
to use cultural resources more efficiently and develop ‘a visible common EU strategy on the cultural 
aspects of the EU’s external relations’. It even devoted a separate section to ‘Cultural diplomacy and 
cultural cooperation’, stressing ‘the need for the EU to act as a world player with a global perspective 
and global responsibility’ (Ibid., p. 22) and called for specifically-designated and trained EEAS staff 
to be in charge of cultural affairs at the new EU Delegations. To facilitate the achievement of these 
aims, the European Parliament decided to launch a Preparatory Action on ‘Culture in EU external 
relations’ that was carried out in 2013-2014 by a consortium of cultural institutes and organisations 
commissioned by the European Commission. 
The end result of this thorough exercise was a comprehensive final report covering 54 countries—
all EU members, the EU’s ten strategic partner countries, and the 16 countries of the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy. Of course, it is impossible to reflect the wealth of research and full range of 
ideas of the 135-page report (European Union, 2014a, b) within the scope of this paper, but it is worth 
noting the key messages highlighted by its authors acknowledging that, in the new realities of today's 
globalized world, cultural relations must be pursued on the basis of mutual outreach. That is: cultural 
relations’ huge potential for enhancing European influence, or ‘soft power,’ externally can only be 
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fulfilled if Europe itself becomes ready to learn from other cultures; a great demand exists for more 
and better cultural relations between Europe and the rest of the world that can also deliver greater 
prosperity and human development for all; to profit from this demand, the EU needs to develop a 
cultural relations strategy that engages all partners based on dialogue, rather than just projecting 
individual national cultures of its members; there needs to be a stronger response to the cultural 
interests and practices of youth; EU institutions, national cultural relations agencies, and cultural civil-
society should build a ‘joined up’ strategy based on the values of reciprocity, mutuality, and shared 
responsibility in a spirit of ‘global cultural citizenship’; a cultural relations policy requires strong 
political will, commitment, and adequate funding from the EU budget; such a strategy should be 
implemented mainly by cultural professionals, starting with a series of prototypes and pilot projects to 
inform and kick-start it, ideally also triggering a process of transformative change in the way Europe’s 
international cultural relations are conceived and carried out (European Union, 2014b, p. 9). 
The report, titled Engaging the World: Towards Global Cultural Citizenship, earned almost 
immediate and unanimous acclaim by non-state cultural actors upon publication in mid-2014. EU 
institutions quickly followed suit, embracing both its spirit and several of its recommendations, thus 
generating new actions and concrete pilot projects. Given its nature, the report itself could not— for 
obvious political and legal reasons—receive a full, official endorsement as such by any of them, but in 
practice it has become a standard reference point for all. Perhaps most importantly, it was taken up in 
the Council's Work Plan for Culture 2015-2018, adopted by the Ministers of Culture at their session on 
26 November 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2014), with the objective of analysing its content 
and ensuring proper follow-up over the next three years. In line with this—and reflecting also on a 
European Parliament proposal—the Commission launched a first pilot project already in 2015 
(European Commission, 2015a). A range of other initiatives followed, most of them finding their way 
into the new strategy. The last formal step before the Joint Communication’s preparation came from 
the Ministers of Culture at their Council meeting on 24 November 2015, when the Commission, 
jointly with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was called 
on to ‘develop and present a more strategic approach to culture in external relations’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2015). At that meeting, the Council stressed that such an approach should also 
address the challenges posed by the migratory crisis, radicalisation, xenophobia, and illicit trafficking 
of cultural heritage in conflict zones. 
Alongside EU institutions, an essential role throughout the preparatory process has been played by 
civil-society actors, NGOs, policy experts, lobbyists, and scholars in the cultural domain. The 
European Cultural Foundation, participants in the ‘More Europe-External Cultural Relations’ initiative 
(More Europe, 2017), national cultural institutes and their European network EUNIC, which was 
established in 2006, have all featured prominently as a source of fresh ideas and active first-movers in 
various experiments. On a parallel track, a number of development experts and stakeholders in 
Brussels, as well as in some Member States and third countries, have been working consistently on 
how the potential of culture could be exploited for international development (Helly, 2017). The fact 
that all these diverse agents are working for the same objective seems to confirm that the strategy’s 
formulation process had a distinctive polyvocal, bottom-up character (Isar, 2015; see also Sassatelli, 
2009) which had a positive implication on its reception and may well have the same effect over the 
course of its implementation. The role of the two largest international organisations with a distinctive 
cultural profile, UNESCO and the Council of Europe, also deserves to be mentioned. Both have been 
cooperating with the EU for decades and their major initiatives — among others, the 2015 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, the Council of 
Europe’s 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, and the 2005 Convention on the Value of 
Cultural Heritage for Society (Faro Convention) — have provided useful inspiration and 
complementarity for the EU’s efforts, and their basic principles are reflected in the Joint 
Communication. 
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2. Public diplomacy and soft power on a global scale  
Public diplomacy in general, and European public diplomacy in particular, lends itself as a relevant 
explanatory, conceptual framework to better understand the new strategy’s significance. It is also 
explicitly stated in a comprehensive study requested by the EC’s Service for Foreign Policy 
Instruments (FPI) entitled ‘Analysis of the perception of the EU and the EU’s policies abroad’, which 
was specifically designed ‘to contribute to the EU Public Diplomacy outreach activities’ to fine-tune 
messages and themes to local conditions, ‘facilitating a more meaningful and effective EU 
engagement globally’ (European Commission, 2015b). This study formed an integral part of the EC’s 
effort to ‘revisit the EU’s Public Diplomacy’ together with the EU Global Strategy, the Preparatory 
Action, and the Joint Communication itself. Its scope covered a wide range of relevant themes related 
to the concept and use of soft power, with culture being one of the most prominent. 
The EU’s public diplomacy efforts have received relatively scant attention to date in academic 
research (see Davis Cross & Melissen, 2013) despite a recent surge of interest in public diplomacy in 
general. Public diplomacy itself does not have a single, standard definition, but broadly speaking is ‘an 
instrument used by states, associations of states, some sub-state and non-state actors’ as well as by 
international organisations ‘to understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour, build and manage 
relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values’ 
(Melissen, 2013). These objectives may be achieved by various means including science, education, or 
even sports and lifestyles, but for the purposes of this paper I will mainly cover culture.  
While public diplomacy has a history with roots in ancient times, here I will focus on the period 
starting with the creation of the European Communities, with a special emphasis on current and future 
perspectives. The founding fathers of a united Europe and American post-World War II politicians 
were not the only ones trying to facilitate this process. A number of prominent artists and intellectuals 
on both sides of the Atlantic also considered cultural diplomacy a key vehicle for persuading public 
opinion to shed hostilities and for bringing historical enemies closer to each other (Hewitson & 
D’Auria, 2012). Heinrich Mann, Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, George Orwell, Paul Valéry, T.S. 
Eliot, Denis de Rougemont, Luigi Einaudi were among those involved through their work and 
activities, while American jazz music and Hollywood films also played their part in this conscious 
effort. One of three working committees at the Congress of Europe at The Hague in 1948 was the 
Cultural Committee, which proposed several measures in the cultural field that led to the 
establishment of the European Centre for Culture, the College of Europe, the Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, and the European Convention on Human Rights. Among the Marshall Plan’s three 
conditions, the first two set out that any aid must be provided in a systematic way and obliged 
European countries to work out their plans together, while the third was that public opinion had to 
endorse the policy. 
After these early efforts and the establishment of new European political structures, cultural 
diplomacy remained nationally focused for a long period. Despite their respective countries’ 
membership in the same European Communities, and later in the European Union, the national 
cultural institutes that were its main vehicles almost solely represented their countries’ national 
interests, traditions, and values both within the territory of the EC/EU and in third countries. Today 
this still remains their main mission, even though a slow process of change, going well beyond the 
institutes, can be observed since the late 1980s or early 1990s. Within Europe, this was partly due to a 
gradually increasing number of cultural, civic, and student exchange programs, most notably 
ERASMUS which was founded in 1987; the 1992 launch of the ARTE television channel with its 
European focus also proved to be an important milestone.  
But both within and outside Europe this was embedded in the much broader phenomenon of 
eroding state sovereignties and rise of non-governmental actors, accelerating with what Baldwin 
(2016) calls ‘the new globalization’ driven by information technology that dramatically reduced the 
cost of moving ideas across borders. While Baldwin’s theory deals with the logic of globalisation by 
Tamás Szűcs 
6 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
focusing on its economic and societal features, globalisation also has obvious—albeit, unexplored in 
the book—implications on the broader cultural realm. The smoother and instant flow of ideas, values, 
cultural initiatives, and products as well as the new art forms it has spurred in both popular and high 
culture, clearly escape the control of national governments even though dictatorial regimes still try 
hard to suppress them. Remarkably, almost in parallel to the declining control possibilities, a growing 
interest can be seen in public diplomacy, especially in its cultural dimension on several fronts (Ang et 
al., 2015). While a growing number of national governments have intensified their individual efforts 
across the globe, most prominently the BRICS countries (Holden, 2013), major international 
organisations, especially NATO and the EU, have also become more active in their own right at the 
supranational level. At the same time global flows have resulted in a mushrooming of non-state agents 
promoting their own specific interests and burgeoning people-to-people contacts accelerated via the 
digital revolution. 
At stake, of course, is soft power, a term coined by Joseph Nye (1990), the third— and perhaps 
central—element of the terminological triangle with public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy, with 
each term’s blurred contours allowing it to take on a range of meanings beyond its original conception. 
It is important to note, however, that the term ‘soft power’ does not appear in the text of the Joint 
Communication. This is to signal through the language that the new strategy aims to go beyond simply 
projecting European cultures and, indeed, intends to generate a new spirit of dialogue, joint capacity-
building, and global solidarity (European Union, 2014a; European Commission, 2012). A similar logic 
lies behind the preference for using the term ‘EU international cultural relations’1 as opposed to 
cultural diplomacy in the Joint Communication, but especially in the official documents of the 
Council, also to allay any potential claims of ‘undue competence creep’. When these terms are 
disentangled (Ang et al., 2015, pp. 366-368), it is worth noting that Nye originally advocated the use 
of ‘soft power’ not based solely on culture but also on democratic values and human rights and thus to 
complement rather than replace hard military and economic power in the specific context of American 
foreign policy. As the concept of soft power gained prominence and cultural diplomacy was 
increasingly deployed to serve public diplomacy goals, a simplified understanding of this triangle has 
become widespread in political discourse as well as in the media and in certain parts of academic 
literature. Essentially the three notions are closely intertwined. Soft power’s core components are 
persuasion and attraction; it is based on corresponding resources and can be wielded for good or ill, 
both by public and cultural diplomacy not just in inter-state relations and via supranational actors, but 
also targeting the general public by governments or civilian agents alike (see Nye, 2006, for his 
clarifications). Simply put, it enables a state (or other actor) ‘to attract others to want what it wants’. 
Nye himself refined his approach in 2003, introducing the term ‘smart power’ and in subsequent 
publications (2011a, b) elaborated that effective action requires states to deploy smart power which 
stems from a carefully constructed balance combining soft and hard power, citing Norway and China 
as good examples. 
The US has traditionally been considered the ‘master of soft power’ in terms of its mass cultural 
outreach, while Europe (primarily via some of its members rather than as the EU) as a champion for 
its attractive social model, sophisticated art and literary scene, and high-end creative industry. But 
riding the wawes of a ‘global cultural revolution’ (Renard & Biscop, 2012), in recent decades some of 
the emerging economies have been approaching very fast—especially in Asia, and most notably 
China. In fact, only China has an evident potential in the short- and medium term to challenge the US 
and the EU for global power in the economic and other spheres, with India following but at some 
distance. In 2004, China opened its first Confucius Institute and, as of March 2017, has a network of 
almost 500, complemented by more than a 1,000 Confucius classrooms targeting high schools and 
primary schools across the globe, including 169 in Europe, with new classrooms being established 
                                                     
1
 This term was only adopted very recently; the Preparatory Action and its immediate follow up employed the expression 
‘culture in EU external relations’ which was also used by Ishar (2015a) when examining the various narratives in this 
field and observing its broader connotations. 
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almost weekly across the world.
2
 A remarkable, though lesser-known feature of these establishments, 
is that by teaming up with local universities and schools, they are more dispersed and more deeply 
embedded than Western institutes focusing on the biggest cities (Holden, 2013, p. 26). With the EU a 
‘third pillar’ of the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership, a High Level People to People 
Dialogue (HPPD) was established which had its third round in September 2015; in the framework of 
the joint mapping of the EU-China cultural and creative landscape.It was shown that the EU-China 
cultural cooperation is slowly moving from a traditional top-down showcasing approach to real 
people-to-people exchanges in a creative shared space in line with the original spirit of the HPPD and 
the new paradigm of cultural diplomacy. Nevertheless, doubts lingered whether the difference in 
objectives—China perceived that the EU wanted to promote European values and cultural diversity, 
while China aimed to deepen Europeans’ understanding of Chinese culture and history—could be 
overcome soon (Dewen, 2017).  
Russia has also been particulary active in this field since 2007, when the Russkiy Mir Foundation 
was established, and is very keen to forge closer cultural relations with the EU during the 
implementation of the Joint Communication. Despite Russia’s recent attempts to intervene in election 
processes in the US and several EU countries (Germany, France, Bulgaria, etc.) and the particular 
nature of its public diplomacy which is often considered part of Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare’ artillery 
(Political Capital, 2017),
3
 the EU has remained open to engaging in joint cultural projects.  
Of all these countries, China obviously has the biggest impact, but is certainly not alone. With 
power in general becoming ever more diffuse and shifting globally towards the East and South, new 
research that ranks soft power (USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2016)—and which, according to 
Nye, offers ‘the clearest picture of global soft power to date’—reveals that soft power is rising faster 
in North America and Asia than in Europe. While the index’s ‘top 30’ is still dominated by the West 
(15 EU members rank in this tier), Russia, South Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, Argentina, and 
Brazil also make the grade along with China, although Africa is still missing. This observation is in 
line with several other recent analyses (Holden, 2013; House of Lords Select Committee on Soft 
Power, 2014) pointing to the fact that in contrast to major BRICS investments with a long-term goal of 
gaining cultural influence, Western governments (with the exception of Germany) are cutting back on 
culture-related funding, driven by a short-termist mindset under the pressure of economic crisis. In 
part to compensate for this trend, ‘European countries have been shifting their strategic focus by 
reducing their activities in other European countries and strenghtening their presence in the Middle 
East and Asia’ (Holden, 2013, p. 27).  
3. How to respond to the new challenges ? 
The new realities of our globalised world have also been recognised by the Joint Communication, and 
it is clear that in the medium to long run, Member States together could act more effectively in this 
field as well. Recent studies have shown a wide range of policy instruments at the EU’s disposal to 
maintain or even increase its influence. Despite cutbacks, EU Member States taken together have more 
than 900 cultural institutes within the EU and almost 1,300 outside the EU, employing approximately 
                                                     
2
 See a full list on the Confucius HQ’s webpage: http://english.hanban.org/; in March 2017, 169 institutes were in Europe, 
157 in America, and 46 in Africa, with new classrooms being established almost on a weekly basis all over the world. 
3
 A recent extensive report by Political Capital (PC) describes how the Kremlin’s strategy supports fringe, extremist or 
paramilitary organisations in order to undermine bilateral ties with Ukraine and the United States, and destabilise the 
region after 2014. It also shows that Russia has been involved in similar activities all over the Western world, assisting 
actors ranging from the Italian Lega Nord to the Californian secessionist movement. Three CEE research institues also 
launched a regular ‘disinformation monitor’ to draw public attention to how easily digestible pro-Kremlin content built 
on fake news, disinformation, conspiracy theories, anti-Western sentiment is being spread by the Russian propaganda. 
For the five case-studies and more details on the report as well as the monitor see : 
http://www.politicalcapital.hu/index_gb.php  
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30,000 people worldwide and producing a global turnover of more than EUR 2.3 billion per year 
(European Parliament, 2016a, p. 11). These figures should be seen in the context of the newly 
envisaged role of the 139 EU Delegations run by the European External Action Service and the EU 
National Institutes for Culture, EUNIC, an umbrella network of member organisations from 28 
countries with some 100 clusters around the world.. In addition, for example, the Erasmus Mundus 
scheme has provided grants to well over 6,000 students in Asia alone since 2004, while under the 7th 
Framework Programme, a comparable number of Asian researchers participated in Marie Sklodowska-
Cuire actions (European Parliament, 2015, p. 5). If given a clear mandate to deal substantively with 
EU issues, pooling the expertise and resources of national cultural institutes would be able to work 
both in the interests of the EU and individual Member States. More joint activities would contribute to 
leveraging scale and increasing the visibility of the EU around the globe (European Parliament, 2016a, 
p. 12). This means that the EU, acting collectively, still has by far the largest cultural network and 
would have the necessary capabilities to engage effectively in third countries across the globe. 
Whether and how this impressive European toolbox of cultural, scientific, and educational diplomacy 
would be used is, of course, a matter of political vision and will. 
Therefore the real question is whether the Joint Communication is well-suited to provide a new 
momentum that would ‘put culture at the heart of EU international relations’, as both HRVP Federica 
Mogherini (EEAS, 2016b) and Commissioner Tibor Navracsics (2016) have repeatedly stated, and 
how its implementation will unfold. The prerequisites seem to be there: the text reflects a 
comprehensive approach, including all existing and planned cooperation initiatives and financing 
mechanisms in a coherent way. Based on mutual respect and inter-cultural dialogue, it argues for a 
new model of enhanced cooperation with Member States, national cultural institutes, third countries, 
other international organisations, and private and public operators. Its emphasis on placing cultural 
diversity as an integral part of the values of the EU is also a defining element, and it aims at synergies 
during the implementation phase, which should be tailored to local sensitivities and regional 
characteristics.  
In this spirit, it sets out three key objectives for creating a framework to advance international 
cultural cooperation with all partner-countries and other actors, highlighting the importance of the 
2005 UNESCO Convention, in particular: 
 supporting culture as an engine for sustainable social and economic development;  
 promoting culture and intercultural dialogue for peaceful inter-community relations; and,  
 reinforcing cooperation on cultural heritage.  
By such an arrangement the new strategy can provide focus for the work ahead. The Joint 
Communication’s Section 3 (European Commission, 2016a, pp. 7-12) outlines the core activities, from 
new initiatives like planning a legislative proposal to combat illicit traficking of cultural heritage to 
well-established projects like Med Culture (2014-2018) that have already proved their worth and are to 
be continued with promising additions like MedFilm, a new capacity-building programme to tackle 
sensitive issues in the Southern Neigbourhood. 
In order to enable the EU and its Member States to cooperate effectively, the Joint Communication 
also offers a second ‘building block’: five guiding principles for shaping a more strategic and global 
approach. The first three principles are value-based and the others are more technical/pragmatic:  
 to promote cultural diversity and respect for human rights; 
 to foster mutual respect and inter-cultural dialogue; 
 to ensure respect for complementarity and subsidiarity; 
 to encourage a cross-cutting approach to culture; and,  
 to promote culture through existing frameworks for cooperation. 
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These principles aim at ensuring that all EU actions remain coherent, promote basic European values, 
and respect subsidiarity. As most Member States already have extensive international cultural ties (of 
varying intenisty and breadth as a result of their respective historical, cultural, financial, and social 
characteristics), and the EU has well-defined thematic and geographic cooperation frameworks with 
dedicated financing instruments, there was no need to ‘reinvent the wheel’. Rather, the real challenge 
was to bring all these elements under the same umbrella so that different activities could be 
implemented within the same overall vision. 
Emphasising the need for partnerships, the Joint Communication also outlines the various 
institutional tools, civil society, and stakeholder engagement mechanisms as well as inter-cultural 
exchange possibilities. Such a concerted approach is expected to allow actors to avoid duplications, 
pool resources, and achieve economies of scale. Of course, the creation of a coherent, strategic 
approach is highly commendable, but only a first step. The real test is to live up to the multifaceted 
challenges of implementation in a complex environment. Early indications suggest this is off to a good 
start along two main tracks, even though it is likely to be a very long process.  
3.1. Fast take up in the inter-institutional framework and among stakeholders 
An important early engagement of key actors both in terms of institutional follow up and stakeholder 
activity was ensured. The text was presented in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council of 
Ministers (CAC, CODEV, COAFR working groups + Coreper I) in September 2016 and it was well 
received (Interviews 1; 6; 7). This enabled the political level, the Culture Ministers, to welcome the 
EC/EEAS approach at their meeting in November (Council of the European Union, 2016b). Equally, 
or perhaps even more importantly, the Foreign Affairs Council in October had also highlighted 
‘cultural diplomacy as an additional, valuable tool to achieve the goals set out in the EUGS’ in its 
conclusions on the EU Global Strategy for Foreign And Security Policy (Interview 2; Council of the 
European Union 2016a). At the same time it also ‘stressed the need of joining up efforts in the field of 
public diplomacy including strategic communication, inside and outside the EU, to speak with one 
voice and ultimately promote its core values’. 
Most recently, Conclusions on the Joint Communication were adopted on 23 May 2017 at the 
Culture Council (Council of the European Union, 2017c). In this context, a Friends of Presidency 
Group was established to act as a cross-cutting platform to highlight the role of culture in other 
Council formations and to draw up an integrated strategic approach for international cultural relations. 
This Council Group was also tasked to develop a road map identifying issues where joint action at EU 
level could be undertaken. If its operation lives up to the expectations, the General Affairs Council 
may be able to adopt a set of Conclusions during the European Year of Cultural Heritage in 2018 in 
order to politically reaffirm the Member States’ commitment. Such a working method has a potential 
to facilitate the implementation. Applying a combined cultural/diplomatic approach that has been 
missing in the past is an encouraging step, but the deliverables will depend on the level of political 
attention and support from Member State capitals (Interviews 1; 3; 6; 7). The Council also requested 
the EC/EEAS to set up a single access web portal in the field of international cultural relations that has 
been a long-standing demand from cultural actors.  
The European Parliament opted for a similar two-pronged approach by working on a joint report of 
the Culture and Education Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, with its expected final 
adoption in July 2017. The draft European Parliament report (2016b) also welcomes the Joint 
Communication, but is even more ambitious than the Council as it calls for the development of an 
effective EU strategy on international cultural relations, annual and multiannual action plans, and a 
dedicated budget line in the next Multiannual Financial Framework to support actions in this field. The 
very fact that these meetings in the Council and the European Parliament were organized as joint 
sessions is in itself already a welcome break from the past, reinforcing the hope that culture could 
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indeed be ‘placed at the heart of the EU’s foreign policy’, echoing the speech of HRVP Mogherini at 
the European Culture Forum in April 2016 (Interviews 2; 3). 
Meanwhile, the European Committee of the Regions (2016) adopted its opinion on 8 February 
2017, while the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) has scheduled the adoption of its 
own for June 2017. The Committee of the Regions also organized a stakeholder consultation and 
included the results in its opinion. In addition to containing important critical observations, both 
opinions are overwhelmingly positive and constructively argue for even more ambition and further 
steps. Similarly to the European Parliament, both call on Member States to adopt an effective final 
strategy. It is also important to note that in most Member States, local and regional authorities are 
responsible for several sectors addressed in the Joint Communication, especially culture, education, 
tourism, development, and employment; thus, more than 90 regions have already signalled their 
interest to participate in its implementation. 
With regards to stakeholders, an Administrative Arrangement (EEAS, 2017) was signed in May 
2017 for activities to be developed by the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) in 
partnership with the European Commission Services and the EEAS in order to enhance their 
cooperation at both headquarters and the local level in partner countries. The text outlines the joint 
principles, values and objectives, as well as the priority areas of this cooperation, along with 
implementing arrangements. It is important to note that a cross-cutting approach is encouraged as 
‘culture’ here embraces a wide, inclusive range of policies and activities. Going well beyond the arts, 
it includes, among others, intercultural dialogue, education, creative industries, tourism, heritage, and 
development cooperation. Joint pilot actions will be developed by the EU Delegations and EUNIC 
clusters in selected countries where conditions are the most promising, seeking complementarity with 
stakeholders, civil-society actors, public authorities, and international organisations while respecting 
the principles of co-creation, bottom-up implementation, and co-financing, whenever possible, from 
different sources.  
To facilitate stakeholders’ involvement and networking among themselves as well as with the 
relevant institutional players, a Cultural Diplomacy Platform was established already in February 
2016, even before the Joint Communication was adopted. This platform is led by a Steering 
Committee and is funded by the Partnership Instrument (PI, 0,94 MEUR for the period of 2016-2018), 
with a mandate to cover the planning and implementation of a wide range of cultural activites jointly 
with all actors. A useful database of best practices was also established to facilitate the further 
development of EU international cultural relations.  
3.2. Internal arrangements to ensure coherence and a long term perspective 
Further to their good cooperation during the drafting process, the responsible European Commission 
and EEAS services continue internally refining certain initiatives contained in the Joint 
Communication (Interviews 1; 2; 4). Given its specific nature, this kind of activity tends to fall outside 
the scope of most research, even though it could lead to important insights for the process as a whole. 
Follow-up is discussed at regular inter-service meetings, identifying new opportunities and potential 
problems at a technical level under the guidance of senior hierarchy and, whenever necessary, 
referring matters to the political level for further debate and decision.  
One of the most fundamental issues is ensuring long-term perspective and viability. As 
implementation relies largely on existing financial instruments, culture would need to feature properly 
in their programming. At this stage most of them are set in the current Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) until 2020, so for the time being it is more an issue of fitting into the annual cycles. 
Some of the instruments, like the current regional programmes for culture in the Eastern and Southern 
Neighbourhood will expire at the end of 2017, therefore rapid measures would be needed (Interview 
5).  
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However, the much broader question is how to secure funding for the strategy— and for culture in 
general—in the next MFF from 2021 onwards. In this context, due account should be taken of the fact 
that culture-related funding has been on the rise among Europe’s global competitors in the race for 
soft/smart power. Planning has already started for that cycle, and while due to the complexity of the 
budget negotiations a detailed analysis would go beyond the scope of this paper, experience shows that 
smooth implementation and the creation of strong ownership within the EC/EEAS as well as among 
Member States and in the European Parliament would increase chances of achieving a sustainable, 
long-term financial arrangement in the next MFF. For that to happen, strong alliances would need to 
be built within and among the respective institutions as well as along the sectorial axis among national 
administrations. As the available EU funding opportunities are currently scattered across a wide range 
of different financial instruments handled by different European Commission and EEAS services with 
different eligibility criteria and timelines, the Joint Communication cannot provide an overall figure 
for culture-related expenditure. The most ambitious way to bring clarity would be to create a dedicated 
financial instrument for cultural relations comprising all current allocations with a higher overall level 
for the next MFF. However, given the political and practical difficulties, this remains unlikely for the 
time being (Interview 7).  
As an elevated role is assigned to EU Delegations across the globe in the implementation phase, it 
was judged crucial to bring them on board without any delay and to create ownership. Therefore, 
shortly after the adoption of the new strategies, all were asked for concrete ideas on how to move 
forward and a special presentation was organized at the EU Ambassadors’ annual conference, both of 
which resulted in rich input. Contributions and best practises are collected in a designated database in 
the EEAS HQ, which has the primary responsibility for coordinating this work strand (Interview 2), 
liaising with relevant Commission services (primarily DG EAC, DEVCO and NEAR, but others such 
as HOME, CONNECT and TRADE may also be involved as necessary).  
In this context the European Public Spaces (EPS) project launched by the European Commission 
jointly with the European Parliament in 2007—and which by now covers 18 EU Member States—may 
also provide useful examples of best practices that could be adapted to the local circumstances by 
Delegations in third countries. The EPS network is based in the EC Representations and the EP 
Information Offices within the EU and hosts an array of events attracting all generations, with a 
special focus on youth. Engaging the Member States, synergies were developed with national, 
regional, and local authorities as well as cultural institutes and NGOs in each participating country. 
Coordinated by the European Commission and the European Parliament, this network provides a space 
to ‘host’ European ideas and support unity in diversity adjusted to the different national contexts 
instead of imposing a uniform European vision.  
3.3. The significance of pilot projects in the new strategic approach 
Due to the genealogy and particular nature of the new approach, a number of experiments have 
already been launched before the final adoption of the Joint Communication itself, which actually 
refers to examples of recent initiatives pointing towards the new direction. Other projects followed suit 
in parallel with the debates on the Joint Communication in the EU institutions. It would go beyond the 
scope of this paper to provide a full review, but the selection below should allow a preliminary 
appreciation of their diversity and characteristics. As the implementation is very much a ‘living 
process’, beyond their direct purpose they will also serve as guidance for further adjustments along the 
way in drawing up an integrated strategy. In addition to DG EAC and the EEAS, they mainly originate 
from DG DEVCO and NEAR which actually have the largest budgets to roll out concrete actions on 
the ground through their existing financial instruments (listed among the reference documents). A 
horizontal initiative that is of major importance for many regions and countries that does not require a 
budget (yet should have significant financial, economic, and societal impact) is planned for the second 
half of 2017: a legislative proposal to combat the illicit trafficking of cultural goods. 
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One of the first innovative pilot projects guided by the new approach was launched by DG EAC in 
2015 following up on one of the Preparatory Action’s recommendations with a budget of EUR 
800,000 and with the overall purpose ‘to select a body that will set up and support a (digital) Platform 
for existing networks for young entrepreneurs active in the cultural and creative sectors throughout the 
world and will facilitate the creation of new ones’ (European Commission, 2015a). Its logic is to 
exploit the considerable potential for culture in Europe’s external relations by facilitating cultural 
engagement with Europe across the world in this sector, which is one of Europe's most dynamic, 
generating about 4.4 per cent of the total EU GDP and employing 3.8 per cent of the total European 
workforce. It was expected that benefits for the EU would accrue not only from economic gains 
through increased market access for European cultural and creative industries, but also from increased 
cultural diversity and the wider sharing of European values. As a result, a worldwide network of 
young entrepreneurs from the cultural and creative industries was established that, to date, already 
counts over 1,000 members from the EU and third countries.  
In similar vein, but for the time being on a smaller scale and with a more narrowly-defined 
target group, the Cultural Diplomacy Platform (CDP) launched a Global Cultural Leadership 
Programme (prompted and funded jointly by the EC/EEAS from the CDP budget, see 3.1.) in October 
2016. At its first session in Malta, the 39 participants came primarily from the ten strategic EU partner 
countries, while a number of Member State cultural leaders also attended. This ‘scene-setter’ project 
was highly appreciated by all participants and generated a number of plans for new projects and 
collaborations among the countries, stakeholders, individuals, and civic organisations concerned. 
Building on this momentum, more than 1,000 applications were submitted for the Programme’s 
second session in June 2017 in Athens, and the composition of participants
4
 fully reflects the diversity 
needed to work efficiently in the spirit of the new approach. Beyond the immediate results, this project 
also serves a long-term objective. By their very nature, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations 
achieve their impact on a broad time horizon. Although their boundaries are blurred, cultural 
relations—as delineated by Raj Isar at an EUI (2017) workshop—consist of processes of cultural 
exchange and cooperation that grow organically, and participants of this project will have a unique 
potential to create an informal network on their own which may be relied upon at a later stage during 
formal conducts of cultural diplomacy between states or international organisations or both.  
The division of labour between DG DEVCO and NEAR is based primarily on their different 
geographical responsibilities. Partly as a result, DG NEAR has a more cultural heritage focus, while 
DEVCO concentrates on the Joint Communication’s first two ‘workstreams’: intercultural dialogue 
and social and economic development. Within this framework, exchange and mobility programmes are 
planned as well as activities for strengthening the creative sectors, with special attention on SMEs 
involved in art projects (EUI 2017: DG DEVCO contribution; Interview 4). Cultural cooperation has 
been an important part of EU development policy in the past and this was re-affirmed in May 2017 by 
the Council’s adoption of a Commission proposal for a new European Consensus on Development 
(ECD) (Council of the European Union, 2017b) responding to the UN’s 2030 Agenda on Sustainable 
Development from 2015. The 2030 Agenda marked a major global shift in the role of culture in 
development by acknowledging global citizenship, cultural diversity, and intercultural dialogue as 
overarching principles for sustainable development. Although there is no specific goal on culture, it is 
explicitly mentioned in goals related to education, sustainable growth, and consumption patterns (local 
development/tourism), cities-heritage, and is intrinsically linked to Goal 5 (gender equality). The ECD 
itself contains a specific point (35) devoted to culture, among other closely related cross-cutting issues 
like migration (38-42), education (28) or youth (32) in line with the Joint Communication’s overall 
objective to strengthen culture’s role in EU international relations. The new projects will be rolled out 
in this conceptual framework, emphasizing that culture is both an enabler and an important component 
of development and may facilitate social inclusion, freedom of expression, identity building, civil 
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 The list of participants can be downloaded from the Cultural Diplomacy Platform (cultureinexternalrelations.eu) under 
the Global Cultural Leadership Programme: Platform activities, Trainings, 5 May 2017, Selection Results, GCLP 2017. 
The challenges of an EU strategy for international cultural relations in a multipolar world 
European University Institute 13 
empowerment and conflict prevention while strengthening economic growth. The new projects will be 
based on the EU’s universal human and democratic values to achieve sustainable development while 
taking local circumstances into account. 
The first large-scale example, a new scheme for EUR 9.7 million (via the DCI – Development 
Cooperation Instrument), was launched in 2017 by DG DEVCO under the Global Public Goods and 
Challenges Programme to support cooperation with civil society and local authorities in promoting 
intercultural dialogue in post-conflict areas and fragile democracies (European Commission, 2017 ). 
The global objective is to promote intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity, and respect for equal 
dignity of all people in the project countries. The specific objectives are to i) enhance cultural 
pluralism and intercultural understanding, and ii) enhance social inclusion and social cohesion 
(notably of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, minorities, migrants, women and girls, disabled). 
Culture is used as privileged means for intercultural dialogue, which particularly in fragile contexts, 
may be effective in overcoming stereotypes, negative perceptions, avoiding polarisation along 
minority lines or belief or social divides, and promoting social inclusion and social cohesion as well as 
post-conflict recovery and reconciliation.  
Among projects launched earlier—but based on the above principles—the most comprehensive 
scheme unfolds in Tunisia, with a total budget of EUR 6 million for two years financed by DG NEAR 
and managed by the EU Delegation. Its first strand aims at cooperating with the national authorities to 
redefine cultural policy in Tunisia, while the second directly targets the cultural sector and is 
implemented by the British Council on behalf of, and in cooperation with, the EUNIC network. This 
project is in line with the principles of the recently-signed ‘Administrative Arrangement’ as Tunisia is 
currently the country in the Neighbourhood South region where conditions are most favourable. By 
promoting cultural diversity and providing access to culture, freedom of expression and creation 
would also be supported with an emphasis on youth, women, and marginalized groups; this has the 
obvious broader political purpose of nurturing the democratization process and facilitating 
stabilization of the country in a highly volatile environment. In line with this, and prompted by the 
project’s success, Tunisia became the first in the region to join the Creative Europe Programme 
(Council of the European Union, 2017a) as of May 2017. Given its components and attractive content, 
this cooperation is also considered a model for other countries and regions, wherever possible 
(Interviews 1; 2; 3; 5).  
Reflecting the different circumstances in sub-Saharan Africa, a smaller-scale three-year (2016-
2019) strategic cooperation agreement was drawn up between the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and the local EU Delegation. Although the agreement itself does not contain a 
concrete financial commitment, it will be funded primarily by DG DEVCO and the Delegation with 
the active involvement of EUNIC and national cultural institutes in its implementation. The overall 
aim is to enter into collaborative artistic projects in several fields and assist the development of a 
cultural sector/policy, which is currently unstructured and practically without state support. The 
culture of Congo is rich, diverse, and creative, and the country is open to European culture, although 
traditionally this has meant an attention to individual countries rather than to the EU as a whole (based 
on EL-CSID, 2017 notes). It is too early to judge how this will evolve, but if it performs well, it may 
eventually serve as best practice for some others in that region. 
Planning is also under way for 2018. On a horizontal note, the European Year of Cultural Heritage 
with its own EUR 8 million budget (European Parliament, 2017) will certainly offer ample 
opportunities for a wide range of international cooperations. As cooperation on cultural heritage is one 
of the Joint Communication’s three main workstreams, strong synergies will be explored; 2018 will 
also be the first time to roll out a coordinated European Film Festival Programme across the globe. 
Film festivals are one of the most effective instruments for reaching a mass audience—over 400,000 
people on-site each year and 12 million online in China alone. There are currently 76 EU Delegations 
involved in organizing such events to promote the EU, but in a somewhat discordant fashion. A recent 
study (KEA, 2015) concluded that a streamlined, strategically coordinated operation both at central 
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and decentralized levels would lead to major improvements in a cost-effective way. This would entail 
preparing a package of 15 to 30 recent, high quality, award-winning or box-office-hit European films 
with proper subtitling and a support scheme for their promotion with the involvement of professionals 
from the European audiovisual sector at the level of the EEAS HQ. This would be available for all EU 
Delegations which should tailor their screenings to fit the local contexts in partnership with national 
actors and side events to increase the collaborative dimension. A concrete EC/EEAS proposition is 
being worked out along these lines with an appropriate budgetary allocation to be finalized in the 
coming months (Interviews 1; 2; 3).  
Of course each region and country must be evaluated individually, as circumstances can differ 
radically, even in neighbouring states. What is essential to remember, however, is that all these 
examples have a clear common thread. None of these actions are about replacing what Member States 
have been doing well on their own for many years: these are actions where a joint approach brings 
more benefits than simply what the sum of bilateral initiatives could have delivered. Several national 
cultural institutes are working together, and the EU is playing a ‘facilitating’ role to enable bottom-up 
approaches and provide added value. Many players are mobilized, including local authorities and 
cultural actors, by pooling strengths and resources to bring mutual benefits to everyone involved.  
4. Perspectives and relevance of the nascent strategy in a rapidly evolving international 
and intra-EU  
This paper analysed the gradual development of the EU's international cultural relations in the context 
of global public diplomacy, exploring also the terminology and use of soft power. While their roots 
were traced back to the post-World War II quest for peace and a European identity, culture only found 
a legal base in EU primary law in 1993 in the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 128 TEC), and it took another 16 
years before it was further consolidated in the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 167 TFEU). It was shown that in 
recent decades, international and intra-EU developments have gathered pace embedded in much wider 
global processes: eroding state sovereignties, the rise of non-governmental actors, and the fast 
expansion of information technology. Therefore, the EC’s ‘European Agenda for Culture in a 
globalizing world’ created in 2007 the first strategic framework for enhancing the role of culture in the 
EU’s external relations and development policy in a very competitive environment. A growing number 
of emerging economies are vying against the US and the EU—the ‘traditional masters of soft 
power’—for influence, and the paper found that EU Member States can only withstand this pressure 
by acting together.  
On the plus side, since 2007 a sustained, cumulative effort of European institutions and cultural 
entrepreneurs led to the adoption in 2016 of the Joint Communication which responded to the new 
challenges by advocating a new model for synergic cooperation with Member States, national cultural 
institutes, and private and public operators, and by introducing a new approach to EU cultural 
diplomacy focused on the development of genuine international cultural exchanges. A close reading of 
the stream of subsequent Council, Commission, and European Parliament documents (see sections 1, 
3.1.) since 2007 shows how the intention for an increased EU role in this area has evolved with the 
realization that in today’s globalized world, cultural relations must be pursued on the basis of mutual 
outreach. This is also reflected in the visible shift from projecting individual national cultures to 
engaging all partners with joint actions based on dialogue, both in terms of the language used (not just 
in EU documents, but even the British Council switching from ‘showcasing’ to ‘sharecasing’)5 and in 
terms of concrete projects (see section 3.3.).  
Of course these are only first steps on a long journey that is still fraught with difficulties both 
outside and within the EU. Internally, an overarching weakness is the general tendency of EU political 
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and media actors for self-flagellation and projecting a European political culture of negativity. This 
should be overcome in order to develop and promote a strong counter-narrative based on solid, 
positive facts that could support the implementation of the Joint Communication. I share the view that 
publishing the EU’s Global Strategy just a few days after the Brexit referendum in a way points in this 
direction, expressing the belief in a confident and resilient EU (Cross, 2013; Tocci, 2016) as well as 
re-affirming the need to maintain unity. More specifically, on a practical level, a constructive solution 
would be necessary for the future role of the British Council in this realm in a post-Brexit scenario. 
National cultural institutes from smaller Member States should be encouraged to actively participate in 
EUNIC, both to enhance its outreach and profit from its wider resources. More clarity on the division 
of tasks between the Member States, the EU, and other international organisations would also be 
useful to achieve during the Friends of Presidency Group’s upcoming discussions, as well as a better 
definition of target groups, more precise and measurable objectives, and technical implementation 
modalities. Strengthening the coordination in the EEAS HQ and increasing the management capacities 
of a significant number of EU Delegations would also require dedicated human and financial 
resources. 
Tackling the above weaknesses would be all the more important in light of the significant external 
challenges which are partly related to how Europe could be positioned among the new world powers 
on a rapidly evolving global scene (see also section 2). In this context four interrelated initiatives stand 
out due to their magnitude, outreach, and broad time-horizon: 
 the China-Africa people-to-people and cultural cooperation mechanism (Baohong, 2016) 
coupled with ever-deepening non-governmental exchanges;  
 evolving cooperations in the framework of the Ancient Civilization Forum (Xinhua, 2017b) 
involving 10 countries representing major ancient civilizations—China, Bolivia, Egypt, India, 
Iran, Iraq, Mexico, Peru, Greece, and Italy—representing more than 40 per cent of the global 
population on four continents;  
 China’s plan to develop its cultural industry into a core pillar of the national economy (China 
Daily, 2017) with a new internet-based cultural market by 2020 and by upgrading its industrial 
structure, fostering major brands, and boosting consumption to provide subsidies for the poor to 
buy cultural products; and,  
 the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative to build a trade and infrastructure network along the ancient 
Silk Road routes which were inscribed on the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage List in 2015 
(Xinhua, 2017a) and already won the support of over 100 countries. This latter goal coincides 
with UNESCO’s own Silk Road Project launched in 1988 to promote intercultural dialogues and 
establish links between different cities and civilizations along the historic trade route. 
Advancing cultural cooperation with highly developed strategic partners (US, Canada, Japan, and 
South Korea) will certainly require a different approach, including individual strategies and tactics 
tailored for each region and country-level plans. The 54 country studies contained in the Preparatory 
Action can be a good starting point, but further research is needed, respecting the principles, values, 
and objectives in the ‘Administrative Arrangement’ between EUNIC and the EC/EEAS. In this 
framework, EUNIC has already identified a number of challenges in certain regions, among which 
those facing sub-Saharan Africa seem to be the most daunting (see EL-CSID, 2017). There is a 
growing tendency to turn away from ‘the global North’ as a primary system of reference towards a 
pan-African dialogue and a dialogue with the ‘global South’ in order to review history and develop 
original African positions. This is also related to on-going reflections on post-colonial issues, 
including the power relationship between ‘North and South’. Approaching cultural policies as the 
preservation of traditions as well as spurs for creative economies and potential for enabling artistic 
freedom and mobility offers areas of cooperation, albeit keeping in mind the severe constraints posed 
by an almost non-existent cultural infrastructure (except in some of the largest cities). In this context, 
in addition to China, increased activity can be observed by new actors like Turkey, Brazil, and 
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Morocco (EUNIC intervention at the Malta workshop), which requires attention and thoughtful 
reaction by Europe, for which the nascent strategy could serve as a useful vehicle. 
Concluding remarks 
In view of the above it is clear that a fragmented EU with individual Member States acting on their 
own stands little chance of influencing these global movements across and within other continents. It 
is equally clear that Europe as a whole should urgently deploy its plentiful, diverse, and innovative 
cultural and creative assets to remain a key actor on the international scene. In this framework, the 
Joint Communication is highly timely, and I conclude that the unprecedented ‘twin track approach’ of 
cultural and foreign policy agents working closely together has the capacity to take the nascent 
strategy further than many previous initiatives in the cultural field. Nevertheless, an unambiguous 
support from Member States, and consistent, sustained efforts will be needed to make this a reality on 
the ground. In the past, Commissioners for Culture (similarly to cultural ministers in Member States) 
generally had few powerful allies to ‘push their files’ and were unable to maintain the necessary 
political momentum to deliver. With the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional dynamics have changed (see 
Duke, 2016; Spence & Bátora, 2015), the European External Action Service was established, and fully 
fledged EU Delegations were created that are generally well placed to play a key role in implementing 
concrete projects. Dedicated financial resources were made available for 2017-2018, primarily for 
Delegations in the strategic partner countries, and the process of nominating specialized staff has also 
started, but will need time to be completed. In addition to the two lead actors— EU HRVP Frederica 
Mogherini and Commissioner Tibor Navracsics, responsible for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport 
—two other Commissioners, Neven Mimica for International Cooperation and Development and 
Johannes Hahn for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, have also put their 
weight behind the nascent strategy. This actually reflects the modus operandi of the Juncker 
Commission in general, which applies a more thematic, cross-cutting approach to accentuate the 
interconnection of policies, coherence across sectors, and the importance of political coordination. 
This also means that the strategy is embedded in the ten priorities of the Commission—the ninth, aims 
at making the EU a stronger global actor.  
Of course this new constellation, however promising it may be, still cannot guarantee a successful 
outcome on its own. Critics can point to deficiencies and argue that it is more wishful thinking than a 
depiction of current realities dominated by Brexit, an upsurge of authoritarian nationalism, as well as 
the economic and migration crises. References are made to the declining strength of a liberal 
cooperative order (Higgott, 2017) versus a mushrooming scene of populist and nativist agendas with 
an exclusionary mindset. Some Member States are more reluctant than others to embrace the paradigm 
shift to engage in collaborative projects to increase mutual understanding with peoples outside the EU. 
In other parts of the world, especially in post-colonial states, a sense of resentment still lingers 
concerning any perceived sign of ‘Western/European cultural superiority’ which may impede 
implementation (Van Langenhove & Higgott, 2016).  
However, the Joint Communication can also be interpreted as a timely reminder to uphold the 
fundamental values of European integration (Kausch, 2016) even under very difficult circumstances. 
No one wants to claim that culture on its own can provide solutions to all of the world’s ills (Figueira, 
2016), but not using its potential to contribute to addressing major global challenges would certainly 
be a missed opportunity. It is more ‘en vogue’ to envisage impending problematic scenarios and join 
the flow of overarching meta-narratives of an EU in decline than to search for bright spots, often 
labelled as uninteresting or propagandistic. But if no one goes against the grain, it could become self-
fulfilling prophecy. Notwithstanding the obvious and manifold difficulties, I contend that the proposed 
new approach to focus on developing genuine cultural relations in a strategic EU cultural diplomatic 
framework could contribute towards mitigating some of the negative effects of the multiple crises. As 
also argued at a workshop organized at the EUI (2017), an efficient crisis public diplomacy should rest 
on a long-term foundation, and cultural diplomacy is one of the long-term strategies for creating such 
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a buffer. The ultimate challenge of the coming years would be to achieve a more inclusive, just, and 
sustainable European Union that is able to tackle inequality, consolidate its economy, better shape 
globalization, and reinforce its actions and image on the international scene. For almost 60 years, the 
EU has been considered a model of peace and prosperity. But today an urgent response is needed to 
the interlinked crises. Most analyses agree (Zakaria, 2016) that while rising inequality has been an 
important factor fuelling the populist support expressed in the Brexit referendum as well as in the US 
elections, the key issue was cultural. A recent opinion survey (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016) shows that 
‘fear of globalization is the decisive factor behind demands for changes away from the political 
mainstream’. After the globalization of trade, information, and services, the globalization of people—
manifesting itself in the migration crisis—is the final stage of a long process that is seen by an 
overwhelming majority across all Member States and the US as the most disruptive. When people are 
directly confronted with major cultural changes and uncertainties, most tend to look for protection and 
familiarity thus leading to a reinforcement of national, local, ethnic, or religious identities, values, and 
narratives as well as questioning the EU’s added value or rejecting it outright.  
This shows that in times of crises a kind of re-nationalization—however delusionary this may be—
of the European public discourse and sphere occurs, contrary to the Europeanization of the national 
public discourses and spheres desired by the founding fathers of the European construction. At the 
same time, it is clear that a divided Europe would put at risk its historic achievements and in the 
medium to long run would become unable to remain a leading actor on the global stage. Given the 
(re)emerging national (and regional or local) narratives on the one hand and the compelling case for 
(re)establishing a united vision to maintain global influence on the other, strengthening the EU’s 
symbolic and cultural dimension could help reinforce a sense of belonging to Europe. Europeans can 
build on the continent's vibrant professional cultural sector and its longstanding tradition of nurturing 
creativity. In terms of culture and lifestyle, a public survey (European Commission, 2015b) found that 
EU countries were seen as belonging to the most attractive worldwide by more than 70 per cent of 
respondents in all ten of the EU’s strategic partner countries, including Russia. As shown in this paper, 
conducting international cultural relations on a new basis fits into the broader framework of the EU’s 
public diplomacy efforts, and the European External Action Service is well-positioned to improve its 
coherence. The primary role assigned to EU Delegations in implementing the new strategic approach 
corresponds to their greater potential to increase the EU’s visibility and scope of action as parts of the 
second-largest foreign service in the world. Blending the transformative power of culture into high 
politics across the globe may also bolster strategic thinking and engage the young generation, 
especially, if coupled with an organic, strong, trans-national engagement through digital tools and the 
social media.  
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